I just came across on Baidu this transcript of a talk by fomer Tsinghua University History Professor Qin Hui. Now Qin Hui is an adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Qin Hui: Embracing Democracy – Revelation of Modernization and Transformation of Postwar Countries

On January 15, 2016 Qin Hui, a professor of the Department of History at the College of Humanities [of the Chinese University of Hong Kong] was invited to deliver a speech entitled “Embracing Democracy: Apocalypse of Postwar National Modernization and Transformation”. The following is a transcript of his speech. The forum was sponsored by Lexus and the Economic Observer – Book Review.

Following is a transcript of Qin Hui’s speech.

Most Democracies established after World War I Failed

Qin Hui: Today I would like to talk about the transformation of the modern state, which is a euphemism for democratic transformation.

There is a popular term for the transition, called “three waves of democratization”. Huntington’s summary of the “three waves of democratization” is, I think, empirically problematic. He says that the first wave of democratization was from the American Revolution to the early 20th century. In fact, from 1848 to 1918, the democratic consensus did not make much progress, but the first wave was from the Glorious Revolution in England to 1848.

Huntington said that the second wave of democratization refers to decolonization after World War II, because decolonized countries were founded as democracies due to the influence of their home countries. But in reality, with the exception of a very few countries like India, these countries were not initially established as democracies. These not-democratic-from-the-start countries include Egypt after the overthrow of the Farouk dynasty by Nasser, led by the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and also North Korea, although it does claim the banner of democracy. We don’t usually call these countries failed democracies either, because they didn’t start out as democracies.

The real second wave of democracy, I think, came after World War I. There were different views before about the nature of the two world wars. The Second World War, we said, was a war between the democratic camp and the fascist camp. At that time, many people thought that the democratic camp also included the Soviet Union, which was considered a socialist democracy, and its opponents were three fascist countries.

The First World War, Lenin said, was an imperialist war, but many people at the time believed that there were still high and low values on both sides of the First World War. On the side of the Allies, Germany (the Reich of Will), Austria (the Hungarian Empire), Turkey (the Ottoman Turkish Empire), and Bulgaria (the Kingdom of Bulgaria) were all authoritarian states. Germany had a large constitutional component, but it was also the Second German Empire. And on the side of the Allies, before 1917, another autocratic state was Russia, but as of February 1917, a democratization process also took place in Russia, and this event had a great impact on the war. Many anti-war people in Russia, no longer opposed the war after the February Revolution since they believed that with the February Revolution, Russia was now a member of the democratic camp. The Allies were clearly democracies, while the their opponents were all autocratic kingdoms; the Allies saw it as a battle of democracy against autocracy.

In 1918, World War I caused the collapse of several of the world’s great empires, including the Second German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. The countries that arose from the ruins of the great empires some time before and after the First World War were initially established as democracies. This kind of democratic politics is what we generally refer to as democratic politics – it excludes countries like Democratic Kampuchea. For example, the Weimar Republic established in Germany, the Russian Republic established after the February Revolution in 1917, the Republic of China established by the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, and also those established on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Yugoslavia, were either constitutional monarchies or republics.

Between World War I and World War II, democracy was reversed in almost all of these countries to varying degrees, and mainly for internal reasons. Russia replaced democratic republic with a far-left dictatorship, Germany with a far-right dictatorship. Poland, a country that in the Middle Ages had an aristocratic democracy, the so-called free election of kings, and even in the Middle Ages had no tradition of dictatorship, had a Sanacja regime on the eve of World War II, a government that was a strong military dictatorship. The only country where this evolution did not occur before World War II was Czechoslovakia, but it was eventually occupied by Hitler. During this same period, China’s constitutional experiments after the period immediately following the 1911 Xinhai Revolution suffered a very serious setback.

Post-World War I Democratization Raises New Questions: It’s Not Easy to Get Out of Turmoil with Democracy

Qin Hui: The second wave of democratization failed in most countries. The third wave of democratization, as Huntington said, was successful in the vast majority of countries. What is the reason? Generally speaking, the second wave of democratization was a democracy born out of chaos. The First World War itself was a great chaos, and between the First World War and the Second World War, the whole world was in chaos. Our Republic of China’s subsequent calamities were not, to a large extent, the result of domestic events. Two world wars and a great depression and in addition very brutal civil wars assailed the young democracies. These included the Chinese Civil War, the Russian Civil War, the Finnish Civil War, the Hungarian Civil War, the Spanish Civil War ……

In short, those times were not peaceful. This lack of peace was often the result of authoritarian regimes. Simply put, authoritarianism makes for unrest. The most typical example is China. Many people say that after the Xinhai Revolution, China entered a time of chaos. In fact, this is not the case. Before the Xinhai Revolution, was there not already enough chaos with the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom? More than 100 million households were lost. Although the 100 million people did not necessarily die, but just disappeared from their households. That was indeed appalling. The Taiping war killed more people than died in the War of Resistance Against Japan. In addition to the Taipings, the political system also fell apart, resulting in the appearance of things like the Mutual Protection of Southeast China (东南互保).

Now some people keep saying that democracy leads to unrest. In fact, as far as democratization after World War I is concerned, it was not democracy that led to unrest, but unrest that led to democracy, or rather, in the midst of unrest, people beginning to pursue democracy. Because of this, this wave of democratization also raises the very important issue that using democracy to put an end to unrest is difficult. The Weimar Republic, for example, was socially disordered during the democratization period, not to mention, of course, the countries that had civil wars.

These countries were in fact in turmoil before democratization. Their democratization did not succeed, not because democracy caused unrest, but because democracy did not succeed in putting an end to the unrest. Restoring order in the midst of turmoil is inherently very difficult, this is to restore an authoritarian order or to restore a democratic order. The vast majority of countries failed to complete their democratization process for a variety of reasons, including China’s constitutional experiments after the Xinhai Revolution which resulted in a rather unsuccessful wave of democratization.

Pressure for Transformation Leads to Enlightened Figures in the Ruling Group

Qin Hui: Why was the third wave of democratization largely successful? The situation varies greatly from country to country, but if we were to summarize, you would find that the third wave of democratization did not arise from turmoil, but insteademocratization emerged during a stable period. . For example, the democratization of Spain in the post-Franco era did not happen in the midst of a world in turmoil, and likewise when Eastern Europe also saw its rulers move from reform to transformation. They did not need to end unrest and so their democratizations, were in turn, were more likely to succeed.

Why did the transition happen in the absence of turmoil? Simply put, there are two reasons: on the one hand, the rulers were more enlightened, such as Chiang Ching-kuo, Roh Tae-woo, and so on. But we cannot say that all the transformations that occurred in the absence of unrest were due to the rulers’ enlightenment. Because if this is the only reason, then they would not do anything. Democratic transformation would have become completely unattainable, and there would be nothing to discuss.

Why did the rulers become enlightened in this period? A very important reason is that rulers were under a lot of pressure at that time. Rulers who were not enlightened would have been under a lot of pressure. Few rulers were enlightened by virtue of certain ideas alone with no pressure at all.

If the third wave of democratization has done better than the second wave, I think the reason for the pattern is that these countries, in the absence of turmoil, have a higher chance of having enlightened figures in their ruling groups as society gradually puts more and more pressure on the ruling groups to transform. There is no magic formula that can determine whether a ruler is enlightened or not, but if he is under greater pressure, the chances of becoming enlightened are higher.

All Ideological Resources Can Provide Impetus for National Transformation

Qin Hui: Let’s analyze more carefully, where do these pressures come from? We will find that the pressure can come from a variety of sources. If the country was originally capitalist, then pressure can be exerted from the perspective of the requirements of capitalism itself – imposing limitations on state power. For example, if the Kuomintang promised to implement military-training-constitutional government, then society can demand that you go in that direction and keep limiting government power.

There are also socialist countries that do not recognize that state power has to be limited. But since it is a socialist state, its power is not limited and its responsibility cannot be limited. So the democratization of the Eastern European countries, starting with the June 17 events in East Germany in 1953, has been carried out in a socialist way. In 1953, the slogan of the East Germans was “Down with the Red Sweatshops”: making the point that since the factories were red, the workers should work less and earn more. If the workers work more and earn less than those in West Germany, could it still be called a red factory? In countries like Poland and Hungary, when the people put pressure on the authorities, it was all had to do with public services, social security, and social welfare. These benefits kept accumulating indefinitely, until the authorities could not stand it, and if they could not bear these responsibilities, then they had to accept the limits of their power.

If socialism is claimed, socialism constitutes pressure; if liberalism is claimed, liberalism constitutes pressure; if Confucian civilization is claimed, pressure can be exerted with benevolence and morality; if Christianity is advocated, pressure can also be exerted with the Church. In short, pressure is everywhere, and the key lies in the fact that pressure cannot be limited to the rulers to exert on the ruled; the ruled have to use all means to exert pressure on the rulers.

These pressures can be gradual, situational, and even grand narratives can be absent. For example, a lot of the pressure in Eastern Europe came because there was no pork for sale in the markets, or the heating was not warm enough. These pressure do accumulate over time and lead to a rising tendency for the original intransigence of the ruler to be unsustainable and for enlightenment to emerge.

But we have become biased these days. We think that the so-called pressure can only be based on a certain ideological or cultural resources. For example, applying pressure on the grounds of benevolence and morality does not seem to go as well as applying pressure on the grounds of Christianity or other ideological resources; or applying pressure on the grounds of socialist public responsibility seems to be less logical than applying pressure directly on the grounds of liberalism.

This means that we forego many opportunities and if we don’t handle things properly things can go in the wrong direction. For example, a leftist justification could be used to increase the ruler’s power and at the same time a rightist justification can be used by the ruler to shirk responsibility. If this happens, society will become more and more regressive.

Any ruler always wants to have more and more power and less and less responsibility. If no limits are imposed not only will power expand infinitely, but responsibility also will be shirked infinitely. We [in China] take it for granted, for example, that retirement should be delayed, supposedly because the West is also delaying retirement. But few people ask, in the West delayed retirement is taken for granted, because since they have limited government, the government only has limited power and so of course, can only assume limited liability. You compare with the West in terms of responsibility, how do you not compare with them in terms of power?

You do not exert pressure in this regard, the problem will then come: even after retirement will have to pay all kinds of insurance, if you do not stop it, he will further shirk his responsibility, and by then all will let the dead pay taxes, how is this possible? So all kinds of pressure can not give up, since you have the greatest power to take the greatest responsibility, we should not only delay retirement, but also early retirement, as a matter of course.

Although here we might run up against limitations of language in discussing social pressure: in Chinese when we talk about making a demand, we don’t think of it as the people on the bottom making a demand of the people on top. However, if we were to allow ourselves this concept, then not only can the top demand something of the bottom but the bottom can also demand something from the top. Once we have this concept in our language, it can provide impetus for national transformation and social progress. The success achieved by the third wave of democratization is, in a sense, not only a success of liberalism, but equally a success of socialism. The combination of people’s accountability from the left and restriction of power from the right has contributed to this success. But if the reverse is also true and that is also another possible path. If you were to combine the minimal responsibilities of power argued for by the right [normal given lack of resources and power given to the state in such a system] and combine with it the expansion of state power called for on the left [normal given the great resources and power the state needs in order to provide for its greatly expanded responsibilities in such a system] you get the worst of both worlds. .

To conclude, we should not bring the country to a crisis that puts it on the brink of chaos prior to pursuing democratic transformation. Democratic transformations before and during a major war were not successful because of this. We should not wait until after the crisis and chaos have passed to decide on democratic transformation. Before then we should increase pressure to promote daily life.

(This article is based on the recording of the speech, not validated by the speaker himself)

秦晖：拥抱民主——战后国家现代化转型启示录原创|发布：2017-05-12 10:17:16    更新：2017-05-12 10:17:16阅读 1174赞 72016年1月15日，LEXUS雷克萨斯携手《经济观察报·书评》举办“我的悦读”暨年度好书颁奖盛典，人文学院历史系教授秦晖先生应邀出席并担任演讲嘉宾，发表题为《 拥抱民主：战后国家现代化转型启示录 》的演讲，下文为演讲实录。

2016年1月15日，LEXUS雷克萨斯携手《经济观察报·书评》举办“我的悦读”暨年度好书颁奖盛典，清华大学人文学院历史系教授秦晖先生应邀出席并担任演讲嘉宾，发表题为《 拥抱民主：战后国家现代化转型启示录 》的演讲，下文为演讲实录。

一战后建立的民主国家多数失败

秦晖： 今天我想讲的是现代国家转型，这是比较委婉的名词，指的就是民主转型。

关于转型有一个很流行的说法，叫做“三波民主化”。亨廷顿对“三波民主化”的总结，我觉得从经验事实上讲是有问题的。他说第一波民主化是从美国革命一直到20世纪初。其实从1848年到1918年，民主共识并没有取得太大的进展，应该说第一波是从英国光荣革命一直到1848年。

亨廷顿说，第二波民主化指的是二战以后非殖民化，因为非殖民化的国家由于受母国的影响，建国的时候是民主国家。但实际上，除了像印度这样极少数的国家以外，这些国家一开始建立的不是民主制度，比如说纳赛尔推翻法鲁克王朝以后建立的、阿拉伯复兴社会党领导的，还包括尽管打着民主旗号的朝鲜。我们通常也没有把这些国家叫做民主失败，因为他们一开始没搞民主。

真正的第二波民主，我觉得是在第一次世界大战以后。对两次世界大战的性质，以前有不同的看法。第二次世界大战，我们说是民主阵营对法西斯阵营的战争。当时很多人认为民主阵营也包括苏联，它算是社会主义民主，对手则是三个法西斯国家。

第一次世界大战，列宁说是帝国主义战争，但当时很多人都认为，第一次世界大战的双方还是有价值上的高低之分。同盟国一方，德（意志帝国）、奥（匈帝国）、土（奥斯曼土耳其帝国）、保（加利亚王国）都是专制国家。德国的宪政成分很大，但也还是德意志第二帝国。而协约国一方，在1917年之前，还有一个专制国家就是俄国，但1917年2月，俄国也发生了民主化过程，这件事对战争有很大影响。俄国很多反战人士，二月革命以后就不反战了，他们认为二月革命以后，俄国也成了民主阵营的一部分。协约国是清一色的民主国家，而同盟国都是专制王国，他们认为这就是一场民主对专制之战。

1918年，第一次世界大战造成世界上几个大帝国的崩溃，包括德意志第二帝国、奥匈帝国、奥斯曼帝国、俄罗斯帝国。在第一次世界大战前、后一段时间，在大帝国废墟上产生的国家，当初建立的都是民主政治。这个民主政治是我们一般讲的民主政治，不包括民主柬埔寨这样的国家。比如德国建立的魏玛共和国，1917年二月革命以后建立的俄罗斯共和国，1911年辛亥革命建立的中华民国，也包括在奥匈帝国、奥斯曼帝国废墟上建立的如匈牙利、波兰、捷克、南斯拉夫，不是君主立宪就是共和国。

从第一次世界大战到第二次世界大战之间，这些国家的民主几乎不同程度的都出现了逆转，而且主要是内部的原因。 俄国是用极左的专制取代了民主共和，德国是用极右的专制取代了民主共和。波兰在中世纪就是实行贵族民主制，即所谓的自由选王制，甚至在中世纪都没有专制传统的这个国家，二次大战前夕也出现了萨纳齐政体，就是带有很浓的军事独裁性质的政府。二战前没有发生这种演变的只有捷克，但捷克最后也被希特勒占领了。在这同时期，中国在辛亥以后的宪政实验，也遭到非常严重的挫折。

一战后民主化提出新问题：靠民主走出动乱不容易

秦晖： 第二波民主化，大部分国家都失败了。到了亨廷顿讲的第三波民主化，绝大部分的国家都取得了成功。原因何在呢？总体来讲，第二波民主化是由乱世催生的民主。第一次世界大战本身就是一场大乱，从第一次世界大战到第二次世界大战之间，整个世界是个乱世。我们民国后来多灾多难，很大程度上并不是国内原因造成的。两次世界大战、一次大萧条，除了这几件全球性的大事以外，内战也是非常残酷的，包括中国内战、俄国内战、芬兰内战、匈牙利内战、西班牙内战……

总而言之，那个时代是不太平的。这种不太平往往是在专制条件下造成的不太平。简单说，专制主义就是动乱，中国最典型。很多人说，辛亥革命以后，中国进入乱世。其实不是这么回事，辛亥革命以前，太平天国乱得不够吗？户口损失一亿多。虽然这一亿多人口不见得是死了，只是在户口上消失了，但的确是骇人听闻，太平天国战争死的人要比抗战还要多。除了太平天国以外，政治体系也分崩离析，出现了东南互保这样的事。

现在有些人老说民主会导致动乱。 其实就一战后的民主化而言，不是民主导致动乱，而是动乱导致民主，或者说在动乱中，人们开始追求民主。正是因为这样，这一波民主化也提出了很重要的问题，就是用民主来走出动乱其实并不容易。 比如魏玛共和国在民主化时期社会秩序很混乱，当然更不用说发生内战的国家了。

这些国家在民主化之前，其实就是动乱的。他们的民主化没有成功，不是因为民主造成动乱，而是因为民主不能成功地走出动乱。在动乱中恢复秩序本来是很难的事，不管是恢复专制秩序，还是恢复民主秩序，都是相当难的事。绝大多数国家由于各种各样的原因，包括中国在辛亥革命以后的宪政实验，都没有完成这个过程，导致这一波的民主化相当不成功。

转型压力使统治集团中出现开明人物

秦晖： 第三波民主化为什么会基本成功呢？各国家的情况千差万别，如果我们要做个总结，你会发现第三波民主化不是在动乱中产生，而是在相当稳定的时候就出现了民主化的过程。比如在后佛朗哥时代西班牙的民主化，不是在天下大乱的情况下发生的，东欧也是统治者由改革走向转型。他们就没有结束动乱这个很难完成的任务，因此这些民主化，都比较容易成功。

为什么在没有动乱的情况下会发生转型呢？简单来说有两方面的原因，一方面是统治者比较开明，比如蒋经国、卢泰愚等等。但是我们也不能说，所有在不动乱的情况下出现的转型，都是因为统治者的开明。因为如果只有这样的原因，那我们就不要做任何事情了。转型这件事就完全变成可遇不可求，也没有值得我们总结的。

为什么这个时期统治者会变得开明？很重要的原因是统治者当时面临很大的压力，统治者如果不开明，就会承受很大的压力。很少有统治者在完全没有压力的情况下，仅仅凭借某种理念来开明。

如果说第三波民主化比第二波民主化做得好，我认为带有规律性的原因就是，这些国家在没有发生动乱的情况下，由于社会逐渐给统治集团施加了越来越多的转型压力，使得统治集团出现开明人物机率也比较高。 出现开明人物始终是一个机率问题，没有任何万应灵药可以决定一个统治者是否开明，但如果他面临比较大的压力，变得开明的机率就会比较大。

所有思想资源都可以为国家转型提供动力

秦晖： 我们再仔细分析一下，这些压力来自何处？我们会发现，其实压力可以来自各种各样的理由。假如这个国家原来实行的是资本主义制度，那么就可以从资本主义本身的要求——限制国家权力的角度来施加压力。比如说国民党承诺要实行军政——训政——宪政，那社会可以要求你朝着这个方向走，不断地限制权力。

还有一些社会主义国家，不承认国家权力要受到限制。但既然是社会主义国家，权力不受限制，责任也不能受到限制。所以东欧国家的民主化，从1953年东德的6.17事件开始，一直都是以社会主义的方式进行的。简单来说，就是对统治者实行最大限度的问责，甚至是无限的问责。1953年，东德人提出的口号就是“打倒红色血汗工厂”，既然说工厂是红色的，就应该让工人干得更少，挣得更多。如果比西德的工人干得更多，挣得更少，那还算红色的工厂吗？像波兰、匈牙利这些国家，当初人民对当局施加的压力，都是在公共服务、社会保障、社会福利方面。这些福利被无限积累，使当局受不了，如果当局承担不了这些责任，就得接受权力的限制。

如果声称社会主义，社会主义就会构成压力；如果声称自由主义，自由主义就构成压力；如果声称儒家文明，可以用仁义道德施加压力；如果主张基督教，也可以用教会施加压力。总而言之，压力无处不在，关键就在于，压力不能只限于统治者给被统治者施加，被统治者要用一切的办法来给统治者施加压力。

这些压力可以是渐进的、因势而发的，甚至宏大叙事也可以没有。比如东欧很多压力，就是因为街上没有猪肉卖，或者暖气烧得不够热，但是这些压力日积月累，的确就会导致统治者原来的顽固态度不能持续，出现开明的趋势就不断上升。

可是我们现在的确有一种偏向，就是认为所谓的压力只能建立在某一种思想资源或者文化资源的基础上。比如说用仁义道德为理由施加压力，好像就不如用基督教或者别的思想资源施加压力来得顺畅；或者说用社会主义公共责任的理由来施加压力，好像就不如直接用自由主义的理由施加压力来得顺理成章。

这样的结果就使我们放弃了很多机会，而且搞得不好，还会产生很糟糕的现象，让不同的资源，都可能走向相反的方向。比如说用左的理由为统治者增加权力；用右的理由，为统治者推卸责任。如果这样的话，社会就会越来越倒退。

作为统治者，他从来希望权力越来越大，责任越来越小。如果没有足够的限制，不仅权力会无限扩张，而且责任会无限推卸。比如说延迟退休，我们觉得这是理所当然的，据说因为西方也要延迟退休。可是很少有人问，西方延迟退休是理所当然的，因为他们是有限政府，他们只有有限权力，当然只能承担有限责任。你在责任上跟他们比，在权力上怎么不跟他们比呢?

你在这方面不施加压力，问题就会接着来了：即使退休了还要交各种各样的保险，如果你再不阻止，他会进一步推卸责任，到时候都会让死人交税，这怎么可能呢？所以各种压力不能放弃，你既然有最大的权力就要承担最大的责任，我们不仅不应该延迟退休，还应该提前退休，这是理所当然的。

尽管社会压力的语言表达形式可能存在各种各样的限制，但如果不是把所有的思想资源都理解为只有上面要求下面，而是下面也可以要求上面，那么所有的思想资源都可以为国家转型、社会进步提供动力。 第三波民主化取得的成功，从某种意义上讲，不仅是自由主义的成功，同样也是社会主义的成功。人们从左的方向进行问责，从右的方向进行限权，共同推动了这种成功。但如果反过来，从右的方向卸责，从左的方向扩权，恐怕就有相反的道路。

如果总结，我们不应该使得国家的危机到了混乱状态下我们才来追求转型，像一次大战前后的转型之所以不成功很重要是因为这个原因，我们不能等到危机和混乱发生以后，才来决定转型，而要在这之前，在日常增加推动转型的压力。

（本文根据演讲录音整理，未经发言者本人审定）